Knowledge grows through sharing! To be the best, learn from the best! May all your dreams come true! Collections of Value Investing articles, interviews and videos, especially on Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger and articles from various disciplines to build "Latticework of Mental Models"
Monday, June 25, 2012
Thursday, April 14, 2011
Tuesday, September 07, 2010
Michael Burry, Predictor of Mortgage Collapse, Bets on Farmland, Gold
Michael Burry, the former hedge-fund manager who predicted the housing market's plunge, said he is investing in farmable land, small technology companies and gold as he hunts original ideas and braces for a weaker dollar.
"I believe that agriculture land -- productive agricultural land with water on site -- will be very valuable in the future," Burry, 39, said in a Bloomberg Television interview scheduled for broadcast this morning in New York. "I've put a good amount of money into that."
Burry, as head of Scion Capital LLC, prodded Wall Street banks in early 2005 to create credit-default swaps to bet against bonds backed by the riskiest home loans. The strategy paid off as borrowers defaulted, letting his investors more than quintuple their money from 2000 to 2008, according to Michael Lewis's book "The Big Short" (Norton/Allen Lane).
Burry, who now manages his own money after shuttering the fund in 2008, said finding original investments is difficult because many trades are crowded and asset classes often move together.
"I'm interested in finding investments that aren't just simply going to float up and down with the market," he said. "The incredible correlation that we're experiencing -- we've been experiencing for a number of years -- is problematic."
Still, it's possible to find opportunities among small companies because large investors and government officials focus on bigger ones, he said. He is particularly interested in small technology firms.
"Smaller companies in Asia, I think, are neglected," he said. "There are some very cheap companies there."
Investing in Gold
Gold is also a favored investment as central banks issue debt and devalue their currencies, he said. Governments haven't adequately addressed the causes of the financial crisis and may be sowing the seeds for future problems by borrowing, he said. In the U.S., lawmakers showed they didn't understand how to prevent another crisis when they gave the Federal Reserve and Chairman Ben S. Bernanke additional authority, he said.
"The Federal Reserve, in my view, hadn't seen this coming and in some ways, possibly contributed to the crisis," he said. "Now, Bernanke is the most powerful Fed chairman in history. I'm not sure that's the right response. The result tends to tell me they're not getting it right."
The Dodd-Frank Act, signed by President Barack Obama on July 21, creates a consumer bureau at the Fed to monitor banks for credit-card and mortgage lending abuses. The bill also gives the Fed chairman a seat on a newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council, which is supposed to spot and respond to emerging systemic risks.
Background in Medicine
Originally, investing was a hobby for Burry, who as a resident neurosurgeon at Stanford Hospital in the 1990s typed his ideas onto message boards late at night.
He went to high school in San Jose, California, graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles and then earned a medical degree from the Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, according to "The Big Short." The book portrays him as a loner from a young age who excelled in areas that required intense concentration. While searching for undervalued companies, he discovered his own house was overpriced, prompting a broader investigation of the housing market.
It's possible Burry is part of "an extremely small group" of economists and investors who are "really exceptionally adroit" at forecasting, former fed Chairman Alan Greenspan said in April. Burry has been critical of the role Greenspan played in fueling the crisis with low interest rates.
Goldman Sachs
Burry said Wall Street investment banks such as Goldman Sachs Group Inc. shouldn't trade on their own account and don't always act in the best interests of clients. The firm is disbanding its principal-strategies business, one of the groups that make bets with the company's own money, two people with knowledge of the decision said last week.
"I don't believe that any Wall Street bank always acts in the best interests of its clients," said Burry, adding that he often fought with firms while betting against housing. "It's an incredibly vicious, incredibly competitive world when you're going to go take a position opposite one of those banks."
He asked seven Wall Street banks to help him bet against the housing market, and only Deutsche Bank AG and Goldman Sachs expressed any interest, Lewis wrote in his book. At the end of June 2008, original investors in Burry's hedge fund received a return on their money, after fees and expenses, of 489.34 percent, according to the book.
Monday, March 15, 2010
Wednesday, March 03, 2010
Dr. Michael Burry: Betting on the Blind Side
In early 2004 a 32-year-old stock-market investor and hedge-fund manager, Michael Burry, immersed himself for the first time in the bond market. He learned all he could about how money got borrowed and lent in America. He didn’t talk to anyone about what became his new obsession; he just sat alone in his office, in San Jose, California, and read books and articles and financial filings. He wanted to know, especially, how subprime-mortgage bonds worked. A giant number of individual loans got piled up into a tower. The top floors got their money back first and so got the highest ratings from Moody’s and S&P, and the lowest interest rate. The low floors got their money back last, suffered the first losses, and got the lowest ratings from Moody’s and S&P. Because they were taking on more risk, the investors in the bottom floors received a higher rate of interest than investors in the top floors. Investors who bought mortgage bonds had to decide in which floor of the tower they wanted to invest, but Michael Burry wasn’t thinking about buying mortgage bonds. He was wondering how he might short, or bet against, subprime-mortgage bonds.
Every mortgage bond came with its own mind-numbingly tedious 130-page prospectus. If you read the fine print, you saw that each bond was its own little corporation. Burry spent the end of 2004 and early 2005 scanning hundreds and actually reading dozens of the prospectuses, certain he was the only one apart from the lawyers who drafted them to do so—even though you could get them all for $100 a year from 10kWizard.com.
The subprime-mortgage market had a special talent for obscuring what needed to be clarified. A bond backed entirely by subprime mortgages, for example, wasn’t called a subprime-mortgage bond. It was called an “A.B.S.,” or “asset-backed security.” If you asked Deutsche Bank exactly what assets secured an asset-backed security, you’d be handed lists of more acronyms—R.M.B.S., hels, helocs, Alt-A—along with categories of credit you did not know existed (“midprime”). R.M.B.S. stood for “residential-mortgage-backed security.” hel stood for “home-equity loan.” heloc stood for “home-equity line of credit.” Alt-A was just what they called crappy subprime-mortgage loans for which they hadn’t even bothered to acquire the proper documents—to, say, verify the borrower’s income. All of this could more clearly be called “subprime loans,” but the bond market wasn’t clear. “Midprime” was a kind of triumph of language over truth. Some crafty bond-market person had gazed upon the subprime-mortgage sprawl, as an ambitious real-estate developer might gaze upon Oakland, and found an opportunity to rebrand some of the turf. Inside Oakland there was a neighborhood, masquerading as an entirely separate town, called “Rockridge.” Simply by refusing to be called “Oakland,” “Rockridge” enjoyed higher property values. Inside the subprime-mortgage market there was now a similar neighborhood known as “midprime.”
But as early as 2004, if you looked at the numbers, you could clearly see the decline in lending standards. In Burry’s view, standards had not just fallen but hit bottom. The bottom even had a name: the interest-only negative-amortizing adjustable-rate subprime mortgage. You, the homebuyer, actually were given the option of paying nothing at all, and rolling whatever interest you owed the bank into a higher principal balance. It wasn’t hard to see what sort of person might like to have such a loan: one with no income. What Burry couldn’t understand was why a person who lent money would want to extend such a loan. “What you want to watch are the lenders, not the borrowers,” he said. “The borrowers will always be willing to take a great deal for themselves. It’s up to the lenders to show restraint, and when they lose it, watch out.” By 2003 he knew that the borrowers had already lost it. By early 2005 he saw that lenders had, too.
Monday, April 07, 2008
Michael Burry: Hedge fund manager saw subprime meltdown coming
The last time we wrote about Michael Burry, he was a Santa Teresa High School student preparing for the 1988 Academic Decathlon. The nervous kid who was trying to speed-memorize the names of the presidents has since become Dr. Michael Burry, with degrees from UCLA and Vanderbilt School of Medicine and a partly completed residency in neurology at Stanford Hospital.
During that residency, Burry expanded on an interest in investing that he's had since elementary school. When his father died in 1996, he was in his third year of medical school, and he took on the responsibility of helping to direct his family's finances. A year later, he began an investment blog that eventually drew national attention as Valuestocks.net.
In 2000, he left his neurology residency and started Scion Capital, a hedge fund now with more than $900 million under management. It's in Cupertino, far from the buzz of Wall Street.
Burry, 36, recently gained some fame making lots of money for his investors - returns were up 137 percent in 2007, he said - by betting against subprime mortgages. He told us what tipped him off that things were going to go badly for the subprime mortgage market, and he has some theories about why so few people saw it coming.